In some approaches to the declarative semantics of logic programming, a program is treated as shorthand for the propositional program Ground( ) whose rules are the ground instances of the rules of . We relate the success and failure of a program with a goal G under SLDNF with constructive negation to the success and failure of Ground( ) with ground instances of G under propositional SLDNF. As a corollary, we get a soundness theorem for SLDNF with constructive negation relative to the answer set semantics. Since this semantics is closely related to default logic and autoepistemic logic, proofs of such theorems help us understand why the computational mechanisms developed in logic programming provide partial implementations of these nonmonotonic formalisms.
Introduction
In the approaches to the declarative semantics of logic programming developed over the last years, variables in a logic program are often treated as metavariables for ground terms. From this perspective, a program is essentially a propositional object. Having developed a theory of propositional programs, we can de ne the syntax of \schematic programs" | programs with variables | and declare that a schematic program has the same meaning as the propositional program obtained from it by \grounding," that is, by replacing every rule with all its ground instances.
The theory of query evaluation, on the other hand, would lose much of its interest if we restricted it to the case of propositional programs. The use of uni cation, for instance, or the problem of nonground negative queries, would not even make sense in this context. It is not surprising that the idea of grounding has played a limited role in the development of query evaluation procedures. The semantic idea that has had most in uence on that work is the \nonpropositional" idea of predicate completion. For instance, the rst soundness theorem for the SLDNF query evaluation procedure expressed its soundness with the respect to the completion semantics 6]. An important paper on constructive negation is entitled Constructive Negation Based on the Completed Database 5] .
In this note, we try to bridge these two directions in the theory of logic programming by developing a view of SLDNF and constructive negation that stresses the relationship between a schematic program and the corresponding propositional program Ground( ). The \grounding theorem" established here relates the success and failure of a goal G with respect to to the success and failure of the ground instances of G with respect to Ground( ). This theorem shows that, for any declarative semantics based on grounding, the soundness of SLDNF with a certain form of constructive negation is a consequence of the soundness of propositional SLDNF with respect to the same semantics.
As a corollary, we get a soundness theorem for SLDNF with constructive negation relative to the answer set (\stable model") semantics proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz 11], 12]. The answer set semantics follows the ideas of 3] and 10], and treats a logic program essentially as a default theory in the sense of 18] or as an autoepistemic theory in the sense of 17]. Proofs of soundness theorems like this are interesting because they explain why the computational mechanisms developed in logic programming provide partial implementations of these nonmonotonic formalisms.
Our de nition of SLDNF is a reformulation of the remarkably simple definition due to Kunen 13] . Kunen de ned the notion of a computed answer substitution and the notion of a failed query directly, without rst introducing SLDNF derivation trees | quite complex combinatorial objects (as done, for instance, in Section 15 of 15] and in Section 2 of 2]). The closure conditions in Kunen's de nition can be represented as inference rules. In this way, we arrive at the \SLDNF calculus" corresponding to a given logic program. 1 The advantage of this approach is that it distinguishes between SLDNF as a calculus on the one hand, and proof procedures for this calculus, such as Prolog, on the other. Mathematically, the calculus is much simpler than the process of search involved in the proof procedures, and many questions that one would like to ask about SLDNF are about the calculus itself, and not about search.
Sections 2 and 3 of this paper are mostly devoted to a detailed review of Kunen's approach to SLDNF. In addition, a soundness theorem for the propositional SLDNF relative to the answer set semantics is presented in Section 2.2, and a special case of the grounding theorem in Section 3.3. In Section 4, we de ne an SLDNF calculus with constructive negation and state the general grounding theorem. In the names of the inference rules, S stands for success, F for failure, P for positive, N for negative, and the subscript p indicates that this is a rule of the propositional version of the calculus. Note that the number of premises of (FP p ) equals the cardinality of Bodies(A). In particular, it can be zero or in nite. 2 If j= G is derivable in the SLDNF calculus for then we say that G succeeds relative to . If =j G is derivable then we say that G fails relative to .
The process that leads from a logic program to the corresponding SLDNF calculus is a nonmonotonic process, in the sense that adding a rule to the program makes one of the SLDNF inference rules, (FP p ), weaker. But there is nothing \nonmonotonic," of course, in the calculus itself.
As 
Propositional Prolog
The work of Prolog, in the propositional case, can be viewed as an attempt to evaluate a given goal G by constructing a derivation of one of the expressions j= G, =j G in the SLDNF calculus by backward chaining. In order to nd a rule application that leads to one of these expressions, G is represented as the union of two goals one of which | the \selected subgoal" | is a singleton.
If the selected subgoal does not contain negation as failure, so that G is represented as G 0 fAg, then the rule applied in the derivation last will be either (SP p ) or (FP p At the beginning of this process, the given program is represented as the list of its rules, with the body of every rule represented as the list of its elements. Similarly, the goal G is represented as a list. The order in which the elements of all these lists are initially arranged has a signi cant e ect on the search process. Speci cally, it determines how subgoals are selected, and in what order the elements of Bodies(A) are considered when the bottom-up application of (SP p ) or (FP p ) is attempted.
The Prolog search strategy is incomplete. For instance, given the program p p; p;
with the rules listed in this order, Prolog will never nd the one-step derivation of j= p in the SLDNF calculus. Thus Prolog, viewed as a method for establishing that a given atom belongs to all answer sets for a given propositional program, is incomplete in two ways. First, j= A may be not derivable in the SLDNF calculus even though A belongs to all answer sets. Second, Prolog may fail to nd a derivation of j= A even though such a derivation exists.
SLDNF
In this section, the description of SLDNF from 13] is reproduced in full generality | formulated again in terms of inference rules.
Schematic Programs
Consider a rst-order language L without equality that has at least one object constant and at least one predicate constant. A schematic normal rule, a schematic normal program and a schematic goal are de ned in the same way as normal rules, normal programs and goals (Section 2.1) except that arbitrary atomic formulas of L are used instead of propositional atoms. For any schematic normal rule R, Ground(R) is the set of all ground instances of R. For any schematic normal program ,
It is clear that Ground(R) and Ground( ) are normal programs in the sense of Section 2.1, if atoms are taken to be the ground atoms of L. An answer set for a schematic normal program is an answer set for Ground( ).
For instance, here is a schematic program in the language that includes the object constants a and b, the unary predicate constants p, q and r, and no function constants: p(a); q(b); r(x) p(x); not q(x):
Call this program 1 ; Ground( 1 ) consists of the rst two rules and of the two ground instances of the last rule.
SLDNF for Schematic Programs
In the SLDNF calculus for a schematic normal program , the derivable objects are expressions of the forms j= G : and =j G, where G is a schematic goal and is a substitution 3 whose support is a subset of the variables of G. If j= G : is derivable then we say that G succeeds relative to with computed answer substitution (c.a.s.) ; if =j G is derivable then we say that G fails relative to .
Recall that, in the propositional case, Bodies(A) was de ned as the set of the bodies of all rules of the program whose head is A. For a schematic program, the de nition of Bodies will be more complicated in two ways.
First, a schematic rule can be \applied" to A whenever A can be uni ed with its head, and we need to know a substitution that uni es them. For this reason, a value of the function Bodies will be now a pair | the body of a rule along with a substitution that uni es A with the head of the rule. Second, variable renaming may be needed, so that, instead of a rule R of the given program, we will use its \variant" | a rule of the form R , where is an invertible substitution. 4 For this reason, the argument of Bodies will be not A itself, but a function that tells us, for every rule applicable to A, how its variables are renamed before the uni cation. It is easy to check that the set of expressions derivable in this calculus is closed under the thinning rule from Section 2.3.
The Grounding Theorem
The grounding theorem tells us essentially that SLDNF is sound with respect to its propositional case.
Grounding Theorem. For any schematic normal program , schematic goal G and substitution , if G succeeds relative to with c.a.s. then every ground instance of G succeeds relative to Ground( ), if G fails relative to then every ground instance of G fails relative to Ground( ).
For instance, the derivation from Section 3.2 shows that r(a) succeeds relative to Ground( 1 ). The soundness of SLDNF with respect to the answer set semantics for schematic programs is expressed by the following proposition:
Soundness Theorem. For any schematic normal program , atomic formula A and substitution , if fAg succeeds relative to with c.a.s. then every ground instance of A belongs to every answer set for , if fAg fails relative to then no ground instance of A belongs to any answer set for .
For instance, the derivation from Section 3.2 shows that r(a) belongs to all answer sets for 1 .
The soundness theorem is an immediate consequence of its propositional case (Section 2.2) and of the grounding theorem stated above.
Prolog
The \evaluation" of a schematic goal G is the process of either generating a series of computed answer substitutions for G or establishing that G fails.
Prolog | assuming that its uni cation algorithm produces correct results 5 | attempts to evaluate a given goal G by backward chaining. The rst step, as in the propositional case (Section 2.3), is to select a singleton subgoal in G.
If the selected subgoal does not contain negation as failure, so that G is represented as G 0 fAg, then Prolog selects a matching function f for A and vars(G 0 fAg) and generates, one by one, all elements hB; i of Bodies(f).
For each of them, it starts evaluating (G 0 B) . Whenever an expression of the form j= (G 0 B) : is derived, a new c.a.s. for G 0 fAg is produced by one application of (SP). If =j (G 0 B) is derived for each pair hB; i then the failure of G 0 fAg is concluded by one application of (FP).
If the selected subgoal does contain negation as failure, so that G is represented as G 0 fnot Ag, and A is a ground atom, then the rule applied in the derivation last will be (SN), (FN) or (T), as in the propositional case.
If A is nonground then Prolog \ ounders." It is not capable of continuing the evaluation process.
4 Constructive Negation
SLDNF with Constructive Negation
We turn now to an extension of the calculus from Section 3.2 that corresponds to the use of constructive negation. In the new calculus, the derivable objects are j= G : ? and =j G : ?, where G is a schematic goal and ? is a set of grounding substitutions. 6 
Prolog with Constructive Negation
It would be interesting to investigate whether the algorithms used in the existing systems of Prolog with constructive negation can be described as proof procedures for the SLDNF calculus with constructive negation or for its extensions, in the spirit of Sections 2.3 and 3.4. This has not been attempted in any detail. The following comments can be relevant. Derivations in the calculus from Section 4.1 will more closely resemble the examples found in the literature on constructive negation if we represent the sets of grounding substitutions that occur in these derivations by formulas. Recall that the language of every schematic program is a rst-order language L without equality (Section 3.1). Consider the rst-order language L = with equality that has the same object and function constants as L, and that has no predicate constants other than equality. For any formula F of L = , let 5. This quali cation is needed in view of the fact that most Prolog systems omit the occurs check from the uni cation algorithm. 6. A substitution is grounding if it maps every variable of the language to a ground term. 7. The rule (FN c ) below was suggested to me by W lodzimierz Drabent.
